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Predictability of EU Bank Stress Test Results 
 
Kian Guan Lim* 
 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European sovereign debt 
crisis of 2009, the banking system in EU and in the Eurozone in particular 
has been under-performing and weak. The EU bank stress tests were 
conducted for capital adequacies and to avoid systemic risks. The first test 
results indicated that of over 120 banks, seven banks failed the stress 
tests. Spain, with 27 tested banks, made up the biggest portion of the test 
banks. In this paper we examine using nonlinear LOGIT and PROBIT 
regression models, the predictability of stress test failures on the sample of 
Spanish banks, and identify the principal risk factors to watch out for. We 
find that size, returns performance, and to some extent deposit base are 
significantly more important than other measures that may be small such 
as non-interest incomes and other measures that could be fungible such 
as altering debt durations without materially improve asset qualities or 
reducing liability servicing capacities. Predictability would enable advance 
warning and more time for such banks to repair and shape up. 
 
JEL Codes: G210 and G2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2009, the 
banking system in the European Union (EU) and in the Eurozone in particular has been 
under-performing and weak. The EU bank stress tests were conducted for capital 
adequacies and to avoid systemic risks. In this paper we study using nonlinear LOGIT and 
PROBIT regression models, the issue of the predictability of the stress test failures, and 
identify the principal risk factors to watch out for. 
 
The academic literature on bank stress tests predictability is sparse. Most published papers 
including research papers from financial institutions and public authorities dealt with issues 
related to the benefits and consequences of such stress tests. For examples, Wolff (2011) 
provides a discussion on the need for EU stress tests with respect to significantly declining 
bank equity prices, and attributes the latter to two major factors – the loss of confidence in 
Euro area banking system and the sovereign debt problem of Greece. Zuzana and Petr 
(2012) express how stress tests can be useful to detect systemic risk in banking sector even 
in emerging markets such as Russia. Beltratti (2011) and Petrella and Resti (2013) find 
some evidence of useful information arising out of stress tests in reducing bank opacity. 
Peristiani et. al. (2010) reported similar kinds of results in the U.S. based tests. Cardinali 
and Nordmark (2011) look at stock abnormal returns surrounding the EU stress tests and 
concluded that there were either no significant change or else banks to be tested showed 
negative returns with announcement of a more stringent test methodology. These studies, 
however, do not discuss if accounting information contained in the financial reports of banks 
offer any predictability of stress test results in the immediate future or in the following 
months when stress test is to be conducted. 
 
       
* Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University. The research assistance provided by 
Cheong Sok Fen in this project is gratefully acknowledged. The author also acknowledges the project funding from 
the OUB Chair endowment. 
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Another line of literature seeks to understand the effectiveness of stress tests when given 
different macroeconomic scenarios and their risk implications. Foglia (2009) reviews macro 
stress testing methods developed at selected central banks and supervision authorities for 
stress testing the credit risk of banks using bank-specific measures of credit risk as inputs. 
Lu and Yang (2012) uses a vector autoregression method to find key predictive variables of 
non-performing loans in Chinese commercial banks. They concluded that lower growth rate 
of GDP, slump in CPI, slowdown in supply of nominal currency, and residential property 
prices were key predictors.  
 
Covas et.al. (2013) employ a dynamic panel quantile econometric framework to estimate 
major components of net charge-offs and pre-provision net revenue in 15 U.S. bank holding 
companies using data from 2007-2011. Macro-stress factors were used as inputs and 
projects of future losses in terms of probability densities were possible, but it was not related 
directly to event-based dependent variables such as actual failure of a stress test that could 
spell immediate negative market reaction. Kupiec (2000) analyses the difference between 
stress tests and value-at-risk capital allocations. In these studies, there was no direct usage 
of bank accounting numbers nor any empirical estimation of stress results. 
 
The key contributions of this paper include the investigation of the predictability model for 
how EU banks would pass the stress tests. Predictability would enable advance warning 
and more time for such banks to repair and shape up. This is one robust policy of re-
building a considerably weakened European banking system through more thorough 
investigation of bank problems by the market using pre-stress test financial statements as 
information. 
 
The EU as of 2014 is an economic and monetary union of 28 member states located in 
Europe. Its early beginning was the European Economic Community (EEC) based on the 
EEC Treaty of Rome in 1957 that brought together for purposes of trade and economic 
expansion France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. The Maastricht Treaty, signed 
in 1992 and enforced in 1993, opened the way to political integration by reinforcing the 
powers of the European Parliament, launching the process for economic and monetary 
union (EMU), and transforming the EEC to become the European Union. The European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was subsequently introduced on 13 March 1979 to 
reduce exchange rate volatility and attain monetary stability in Europe. This eventually led to 
the introduction of a single currency, the Euro, on 1 January 1999.  
 
However, so far only 18 of the 28 EU member states or member countries have adopted the 
Euro as their common currency. This group of 18 countries as a major part of EU consists of 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, and are 
collectively called the Eurozone or Euro area. The key monetary policy unit of the EU is the 
European Central Bank (ECB) which has the exclusive right to authorize and supervise the 
issue of Euro banknotes by the national central banks of individual countries of the 
Eurozone. 
 
The American subprime crisis that started the global financial crisis of 2008 had serious 
repercussions on banking systems worldwide, including banks in the EU. Some EU 
countries such as Ireland and Spain had similar real estate bubbles that burst. Other EU 
countries such as Greece, Italy, and Portugal had poor public finances. These problems 
were exacerbated by the global financial crisis, and led to a generally weak banking system. 
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UK also had its share of bank problems. The banking problems, worsening public debts, 
and recessionary economies led in large part to the sovereign debt crisis of Europe in 2009.  
 
Suddenly the global market was not willing to buy some EU sovereign bonds unless at a 
very high yield. A heated debate on the European Union (EU) solution of the sovereign debt 
crisis in 2011 included the idea of the issue of Eurobonds with redemption as a joint 
responsibility amongst all EU countries. See Lane (2012) for a detailed discussion. Other 
details can be obtained from various EU Commission reports. Eventually this led to the 
formation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in early 2014. Under SSM re-
organization, the European Central Bank (ECB) expanded its mandate beyond just Euro 
stabilization to include overseeing in a supervisory role all credit institutions as well as 
capital requirements compliance amongst Eurozone nations. Non-Eurozone EU countries 
may opt to join in this arrangement although none so far had opted so. See various sources 
of reports and analyses such as in Quaglia (2010), Sibert (2012), and also various reports in 
the Official Journal of the European Union (reports 2010, 2013), and so on. 
 
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), set up in April 2004, had been 
serving the role as regulatory advisor and co-ordinator for consistent EU measures across 
the large number of member states. This role was deemed necessary at that time because 
banks from different countries within the EU had diverse characteristics and institutional 
practices. The re-organization and rationalization under SSM converted CEBS to the 
European Banking Authority (EBA). The key role of EBA is to ensure the orderly functioning 
and integrity of the financial markets and the stability of the financial system in the Eurozone 
with optional participation by other EU countries. See Véron (2012) for further discussion on 
this. 
 
One of the key initiatives in 2009 and 2010, in the aftermath of the GFC and the European 
sovereign debt crisis, was for the ECB and CEBS (EBA today), in conjunction with the 
European Commission and the Economic and Financial Affairs section of the EU Council, to 
conduct stress tests of all EU banks in order to assess systemic problems of such banks, 
and also to improve the Eurozone financial system.1 The success of the tests would be 
important not just for providing impetus for sound banks to improve lending and spur 
economic growth but also to create a more transparent and market-based financial system 
whereby banks are judged by their own credit-worthiness rather than that of their 
governments.  
 
The ECB would ultimately take over the regulatory responsibility of Eurozone banks, and 
implicitly, banks that would fail the tests must either match up or be re-organized, be 
merged into stronger banks, or liquidated. The EBA would assist in ensuring consistent 
prudential regulation and supervision across the European banking sector, and work toward 
the development of a single rule book in the Eurozone banks. 
 
In the next section we provide a more detailed discussion of the context of the banking 
stress test in the EU, and also describe the financial data to be used in our LOGIT and 
PROBIT regression models. Section 3 then discusses the approach using qualitative 
response models. This discussion will help identify the key explanatory variables to use in 
the nonlinear LOGIT and PROBIT regression models that are implemented. The empirical 
results are shown and interpreted. Finally, we conclude in Section 4 and provide some 
insights on the usefulness of the EU stress tests. 
 
 
Lim 
4 
 
2. Bank Stress Tests and Data 
 
Following on the heels of the 2008 global financial crisis sparked off by the sub-prime 
mortgage market meltdown in the U.S., the Eurozone also faced a major economic crisis in 
2009 which has been lingering with most economies languishing in low or zero growth with 
the exception of stronger economies such as Germany and some Scandinavian countries in 
EU. Of late in the beginning of 2015, the Eurozone began quantitative easing, but the 
economic results would take some time to unravel. In recent years, noticeably past 2008, 
many countries in the Eurozone faced slowing recessionary economies and the build-up of 
huge budget deficits. Recession was exacerbated by previously huge credit expansions in 
private sector debts and the subsequent collapse of property prices and businesses in a few 
EU countries. 
 
Many firms in countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy, owed far too much debt and are 
not able to adequately service their loans. Ireland and Greece have also been badly 
affected, though with some different reasons. Greece has collected far less tax revenues 
than it has been able to overspend. Many banks in these countries and connected banks in 
other parts of the EU faced enormous credit exposures and losses as many loans they 
made to private sector firms defaulted. Through their central bank bailouts, much of the 
banking and economy woes were transferred to national levels. When some of the 
sovereign states issued too much sovereign bonds to help finance their countries' deficits or 
bank bailouts, the financial market became jittery.  
 
Fears that some of these sovereign states would default on their sovereign debt issues 
became very real, and by 2010, their bond yield spreads reached unprecedented heights. 
For example, by May 2010, the yield spread between a 10-year Greek sovereign bond and 
a German sovereign bond exceeded 10 percentage points. By January 2012 this spread 
reached over 40 percentage points. See Lane (2012). In the aftermath, the ECB and to 
some extent the IMF had to step in to provide emergency funding to some of the sovereign 
states to avert such sovereign defaults. The issue of the exit or not of Greece from the EU is 
still outstanding due to its continued inability to adequately service its sovereign debts. 
 
As a result of the sovereign debt crisis, the EU decided to tighten control of monetary 
policies across its Eurozone members so that the same mistakes such as allowing single 
countries to over-issue Euro denominated but country-specific sovereign bonds could be 
better controlled. This led to agreement to place supervision of all Eurozone banks under a 
single supervisory mechanism under the ECB by end 2014. One of the initiatives of ECB 
has been to assess the constituent banking groups of the Eurozone before assuming 
responsibility for full supervision. To this end, stress tests would be applied to over 120 
banking groups covering assets estimated to be around €30 trillion. 
 
Within EU, precursors to such bank stress tests were done by the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) since 2009. This Committee was succeeded by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) in January 2011. EBA is a regulatory agency of EU whereby its 
responsibilities include conducting stress tests on European banks. In early 2010, CEBS 
conducted a second stress test of 91 European banks across 20 countries in EU, including 
banks outside of the Eurozone such as in Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and U.K. 
The test was to assess the resilience of the EU banking system and to test the ability of the 
individual banks or banking groups to withstand major shocks in credit and market risks, 
including sovereign risks, and to remain solvent. 
 
Lim 
5 
 
There were three levels of the stress tests. Each level dealt with a set of scenarios, 
beginning with mild shocks to major shocks. At extreme stresses, scenarios incorporated 
the impact of a four-step credit rating downgrade on securitized debt products, a 20 percent 
slump in European equities in both 2010 and 2011 and an economic contraction in the EU, 
amongst others. The stresses would stretch over a two-year horizon from 2010 to end 2011. 
A bank under the test regime would pass the test if its Tier one ratio comprising the fraction 
of equity in risk-weighted assets exceeded 6 % in the three levels starting from Normal to 
Adverse, and then sovereign Shock scenarios. The EU-wide stress test results were 
disclosed on 23 July 2010. Seven banks failed the stress tests; five were from Spain, one in 
Germany, and one in Greece. 
 
Spain, with 27 tested banks, made up the biggest portion of the test banks. The five 
Spanish banks that did not pass the 2010 CEBS stress tests were CajaSur, Diada, Unnim, 
Espiga Caja Duero, and Banca Civica. Spain's largest bank, Banco Santander SA, 
maintained its Tier 1 capital ratio at 10 percent under the most stringent scenario. In all, 
Spanish banks alone had capital shortfalls of several tens of billions of Euros. The test 
results helped the EU and its member states to assess and make policy decisions about 
what stringent measures to put in place to improve banking stability and what other capital 
requirement measures would be needed. 
 
The results also affected market confidence in some of the banks that failed the test. Their 
share prices dropped. They might find it more difficult in the short-run to borrow from other 
banks or from the market except at higher interest costs. Therefore it was important for the 
banks and for the market to be able to predict the test outcomes. To the extent that the 
stress-test outcomes could be predicted in advance with reasonable accuracy, the ECB and 
related national agencies where predictably weak or likely failure banks reside would be 
able not to lose time but help the banks to re-organize and shape up. 
 
We consider these 2009 Spanish banks that are marginal or failed cases of the EU 2010 
stress test as being those with tier one ratio scores less than 7.0 in both categories of the 
Adverse and Shock scenarios. In the EU 2010 stress test of 27 Spanish banks, 12 were 
identified in this category, viz. Caja Madrid, Diada (Caixa Catalunya), Espiga Caja Duero 
(Caja Espana), Banca Civica, Banco Pastor, Caja Sol, Unnim, Caja Circulo, Cajasur, Banco 
Guipuzcoano, Caja de Ahorros Y Monte de Piedad de Ontinyent, and Colonya Caixa de 
Pollenca. Those not in this category were 15 Spanish banks that passed the capital 
adequacy stress test by a margin of over 1% in the tier one ratios. They were Grupo 
Santander, Grupo BBVA, La Caixa, Caja de Ahorros Mediterraneo, Banco Popular Espanol, 
Banco de Sabadell, Breogan Caja de Ahorros de Galicia, Mare Nostrum Caja de Ahorros de 
Murcia, Bankinter, Ibercaja, Unicaja, Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa, Kutxa, Banca March, and Caja 
Vital Kutxa. As the cultural and institutional differences across banks in different countries 
and jurisdictions are very different as has been well recognized in the literature, and since 
the SSM would take time to work through to achieve more uniformity, we choose only 
Spanish banks to avoid other cultural and country factors to affect the empirical results. 
 
Financial statements data of these Spanish banks in 2009 were downloaded from 
Bloomberg. However, 2009 data for Espiga Caja Duero, Banca Civica, and Unnim were not 
available. We thus consider a total of 24 Spanish banks in our study. As indicated above, 
they were in two groups, those with weak capital ratios that were marginal or failed cases in 
the 2010 stress tests, and those with stronger capital ratios that clearly passed the stress 
tests. There are 9 banks in the first group of our sample; each of these is given a 
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corresponding dummy variable equal to 1. There are 15 banks in the second group of our 
sample; each of these is given a corresponding dummy variable equal to 0. 
 
3. Qualitative Response Models and Empirical Results 
 
We now investigate how the passing or failing of a bank stress test can be constructed as a 
binary event, and how this can be predicted using relevant economic and financial 
information. The prediction takes the form of an estimated probability. A cut-off can be fixed 
so as to separate cases with higher probability and other cases with lower probability into 
different categories. Such binary or dichotomous variable can be represented by a non-zero 
number for one response, and zero for the alternative response. Without loss of generality, 
1 and 0 are often taken to be the values of the binary variable. Classic cases of using such 
a qualitative response model include the studies of the credit worthiness of individuals and 
also the loan default likelihood of lending to firms. See Altman (1968) and McFadden (1976) 
for such examples. 
 
In this study of bank stress prediction, the binary or dichotomous qualitative response of 
either being relatively unsafe or being relatively safe, with respect to stress test result of 
capital adequacy, is given a dummy value of 1 or 0 respectively. We want to predict ex-ante 
if any bank belongs to the relatively unsafe or the relatively safe category. The explanatory 
variables were collected ex-ante from the 2009 bank annual financial reports. 
 
In the empirical example of the Spanish banks, for different bank i = 1, 2, 3, ….. , 24, we 
define Yi = 1 for Caja Madrid, Diada (Caixa Catalunya), Banco Pastor, Caja Sol, Caja 
Circulo, Cajasur, Banco Guipuzcoano, Caja de Ahorros Y Monte de Piedad de Ontinyent, 
and Colonya Caixa de Pollenca. We define Yi = 0 for Grupo Santander, Grupo BBVA, La 
Caixa, Caja de Ahorros Mediterraneo, Banco Popular Espanol, Banco de Sabadell, 
Breogan Caja de Ahorros de Galicia, Mare Nostrum Caja de Ahorros de Murcia, Bankinter, 
Ibercaja, Unicaja, Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa, Kutxa, Banca March, and Caja Vital Kutxa. We run 
several regressions employing different sets of regressors Xi for each regression. The 
regressors used are ROE, Pre-tax Profit Margin, Total Debt/Total Asset, Log Book Value2 of 
Equity, Non-Interest Income Share of Sales, and Log Total Deposits. Both LOGIT and 
PROBIT regressions are performed using the sample data to estimate the respective  ̂ ‟s in 
each of the regressions. 
 
Suppose we let 
 
 (     )      (       )   ( 
   )  
  
   
       
 
 
Where the last term   
  
   
    
   
   is a CDF with a logistic distribution. Using the specification  
 (    )  
  
   
    
   
  leads to the LOGIT model in the binary response regression.  
 
The likelihood function of joint but independent N observations of {Y1, Y2, Y3,…., YN} is thus 
  ∏ [ (    )]
   
   [   ( 
   )]
    . Maximizing the log-likelihood function log L, we obtain 
asymptotically efficient estimates  ̂. The LOGIT regression results of the Spanish banks are 
shown below in Table 1. 
 
Lim 
7 
 
The empirical results in Table 1 indicate that the best-fitted regression (lowest AIC) involves 
explanatory variables ROE, Total Debt/Total Assets, and Log of Book Equity Value. Both 
the ROE and Log of Book Equity Value coefficients are highly negatively significant at 10% 
and   5% significance levels respectively. If we replace them by Pre-tax Profit Margin and 
Log Total Deposits, the results are rather similar but weaker in the latter. Thus more 
profitable banks (higher ROE) and larger sized banks (higher log Equity Value or log 
Deposits) reduce the likelihood or the probability of failing the stress test. Other variable 
coefficients such as that of Total Debt to Total Assets are not significantly different from 
zero. 
 
Table 1: LOGIT Regression of Spanish Bank Stress Capacity 
The table shows four separate regressions each with a sample size of 24. Dependent variable is a binary 
response of 1 or 0 where 1 denotes a weak capacity and 0 denotes a strong capacity to withstand a stress 
test on capital adequacy. ROE, PM, TD/TA, Log EQ, NII, Log TD, and AIC denote return on equity, pre-tax 
profit margin, total debt/total assets, log of book value of equity, non-interest income share of sales, log of 
total deposits, and the Akaike Information Criterion respectively. The estimated coefficients of regression 
on the explanatory variables are reported. Numbers in the brackets denote t-values. *, ** denote 
significance at 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
No. Constant ROE PM TD/TA Log EQ NII Log TD AIC 
1 14.8164** -0.7346*  0.1198 -1.9341**   20.27 
 (2.18) (-2.04)  (1.72)   (-2.13)    
2 11.9530**  -37.2311* 0.0983 -1.6719*   20.37 
 (2.09)  (-1.80) (1.38)  (-1.98)    
3 13.2178* -0.6844*  0.1155 -1.9758** 7.1694  21.98 
 (1.90) (-1.84)  (1.57)   (-2.15) (0.52)   
4 18.8581* -0.7488*  0.1103  -0.3539 -1.8787* 23.93 
 (1.99) (-2.06)  (1.63)  (-0.03) (-2.03)  
 
Suppose now we let 
 
 (     )      (       )   ( 
   )  ∫
 
√  
  
 
 
    
    
  
 . 
 
Letting CDF function  ( ) be the normal CDF leads to the PROBIT regression model. The 
log-likelihood function of joint but independent N observations of {Y1, Y2, Y3,…., YN} is 
 
     ∑(       ( 
   )  (     )    [   ( 
   )])
 
   
 
 
Where     denotes the indicator variable taking value 1 only when Yi = 1, and otherwise 
zero. Maximizing the log likelihood function, we obtain PROBIT model estimates as follows 
in Table 2. 
 
The coefficient estimates under PROBIT are qualitatively the same as those in LOGIT, 
except the magnitudes are smaller. The data also appears to fit the PROBIT model slightly 
better given that the AIC's are smaller and the coefficient estimate for ROE, for example, is 
more significantly negative. In general, the CDF curve for PROBIT approaches the axis 
faster than that of LOGIT. This is the same as saying that the LOGIT probability density 
function is fatter in the tails than that of PROBIT. 
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Unlike linear regression models or linear probability model where estimated coefficient of an 
explanatory variable implies that an additional unit of the latter would increase the 
dependent variable or the probability of test failure by an amount equal to the estimated 
slope, the marginal effect of a unit change in Xij is more complicated in the LOGIT and 
PROBIT models. Suppose we denote predicted probability as  (     )   ( ̂
   ), given 
predetermined or exogenous information Xi. Then the marginal increase in predicted 
probability of Yi = 1 per unit increase of Xij  is 
  ( ̂   )
 ( ̂   )
   ̂  . 
 
Table 2: PROBIT Regression of Spanish Bank Stress Capacity 
The table shows four separate regressions each with a sample size of 24. Dependent variable is a binary 
response of 1 or 0 where 1 denotes a weak capacity and 0 denotes a strong capacity to withstand a stress 
test on capital adequacy. ROE, PM, TD/TA, Log EQ, NII, Log TD, and AIC denote return on equity, pre-tax 
profit margin, total debt/total assets, log of book value of equity, non-interest income share of sales, log of 
total deposits, and the Akaike Information Criterion respectively. The estimated coefficients of regression 
on the explanatory variables are reported. Numbers in the brackets denote t-values. *, ** denote 
significance at 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
No. Constant ROE PM TD/TA Log EQ NII Log TD AIC 
1 8.7966** -0.4294**  0.0689* -1.1408**   20.03 
 (2.41) (-2.25)  (1.82)   (-2.33)    
2 7.1046**  -22.2494* 0.0586 -0.9895**   20.13 
 (2.34)  (-2.01) (1.50)  (-2.18)    
3 7.8193* -0.4033*  0.0672 -1.1735** 4.5960  21.66 
 (2.09) (-2.00)  (1.67)   (-2.40) (0.60)   
4 10.8098** -0.4351**  0.0621  0.1760 -1.0772** 23.79 
 (2.16) (-2.26)  (1.68)  (0.03) (-2.20)  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The results of the EU bank stress tests were generally better than expected in the years 
since 2009. Our empirical results indicate that those banks with large return on equity and 
large log book size of equity have lower probabilities of failing the stress test. In other words, 
the market has factored in the banks' performance, and where the bank's equity is more 
valuable and its book size larger, the market's evaluation is that the bank is performing well 
and would have adequate capital to meet some degree of unexpected loss or unexpected 
market downturn. These strengths also appear to correspond with pre-tax profit margin and 
a larger depositor base. 
 
However, it is surprising that many other key variables such as total debt to asset ratio, non-
interest income share of sales, asset turnovers and so on (some of these were tested but 
not reported to save space) are not significant predictors of the banks' capital adequacy. It 
could be that many of these non-significant variables are either too small, e.g. non-interest 
income share, or else fungible such as reducing long term debt by switching to short-term 
rollover liabilities that do not appear on the numerator of the debt to asset ratio. 
 
The importance of the stress tests extend beyond the supervisory capacity of ECB and EBA; 
it has in eventuality to do with the total financial health of the Eurozone banking system, and 
to restore confidence in this system in order for business as usual and for banks to be able 
to raise cheaper capital to fund business expansions and economic growth. The stress test 
are generally carried out with the assistance and cooperation of the relevant national 
authorities. However, there is also some distrust in supposing that some discretion on the 
part of the national agencies may not fully disclose the quality of some of the assets used to 
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support the stronger asset ratios. Some of these operational difficulties were reduced in 
subsequent tests. 
 
There has been a simultaneous effort to perform what is known as asset quality review or 
AQR in this regard. Certainly in the future, the bank stress tests would have to combine 
assessments from AQR before testing some of the relevant measurements and ratios. As 
more quality data become available, some of the statistical tests such as those we perform 
in this paper would provide for even more accurate and important forecasts that would be 
extremely useful for macro-prudential management of the Eurozone as well as EU banks in 
totality. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. We appreciate the pointing out by a referee that stress tests started in the U.S. While the idea of 
stress tests on financial institutions was not new, the Federal Reserve had started earlier in April 2009 a 
systematic program called The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program to assess the capital adequacy to 
withstand financial market turmoil of the largest U.S. financial organizations. 
2. Market value should typically be used. However, many of the Spanish banks in the sample are not 
listed and so the market prices of shares are not available. Book values are used as proxies for firm size. 
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